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338 Abstract
This paper uses fuzzy regression discontinuity design to estimate the moral hazard 
effect in health care consumption in the population of young adults. We use in-
voice data for outpatient hospital services from a regional hospital in Croatia. 
The estimation is complicated by the fact that the data set consists only of users of 
medical services, which would tend to underestimate the moral hazard effect. To 
address this issue we use a modified version of the instrumental variables ap-
proach. We find a 92% reduction in the number of hospital visits for individuals 
who lost insurance coverage when crossing the 18th birthday threshold.
Keywords: fuzzy regression discontinuity design, instrumental variables, health 
insurance
1 INTRODUCTION
A large body of health economics literature documents a strong association be-
tween health insurance status and patterns of health care utilization. People with 
more generous insurance coverage tend to consume more health care, a phenom-
enon known as moral hazard. The literature suggests that when individuals lose 
health insurance, they change their consumption of health care services, i.e. they 
seek medical attention less frequently. But would the uninsured consume more 
health care if they had health insurance? Such a causal inference is difficult be-
cause uninsured individuals are likely to have different health conditions, attitudes 
towards risk, disposable income, wealth, and so on than insured individuals.
To overcome this problem, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in insurance 
status resulting from the rules insurance companies use to establish the coverage 
eligibility of dependents. One of the largest segments of the population that lacks 
health insurance is young adults (age 19 to 29). For example, in the United States, 
29% of the uninsured are young adults (Schwartz and Schwartz, 2008). Because 
many health insurance contracts cover dependents until the age of 18 and only 
cover older dependents if they are full time students, a significant number of teen-
agers become uninsured after they reach the threshold birthday. Because young 
adults are relatively healthier than the older population, it is reasonable to assume 
that they would consume relatively low levels of health care regardless of whether 
they are insured or uninsured and that the social cost of extending coverage to 
uninsured young adults would be relatively modest.
The use of terms moral hazard has its origins in the insurance literature and has 
subsequently spread into contract theory and information economics. Contract 
theory refers to moral hazard as an asymmetric information problem arising when 
an agent’s (insured’s) behavior is not observable by the principal (insurance com-
pany). The magnitude of moral hazard is then measured by the welfare difference 
between the first best (symmetric information) and the second-best (asymmetric 
information) outcome. In the context of health insurance, however, moral hazard 
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339tional on underlying health status (Paully, 1968; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000; 
Einav et al., 2013). The approach that we use in this paper is conceptually in line 
with this mainstream health insurance literature. In other words, our approach 
does not consider the potential impact of insurance on underlying health or its 
impact on risky behavior that may have detrimental effects on health, as for exam-
ple in Yörük (2015). Instead, moral hazard is simply the consequence of the de-
mand function for health care being less than perfectly inelastic (vertical) such 
that any reduction in the price of health care services resulting from owning an 
insurance policy increases the quantity demanded. The measure of moral hazard 
is then simply the difference in health care consumption between the full price of 
medical services and the lower price one pays as the owner of an insurance policy, 
conditional on health status.
The empirical evidence on the importance of moral hazard in health insurance 
markets varies by country, type of health service provided and socio-economic 
status of insured. For example, using Australian data, Cameron et al. (1988) estab-
lished that more generous coverage leads to higher utilization of a broad range of 
services. They found a significant price effect in health care consumption, which 
implies that moral hazard is an important determinant of overall health care utili-
zation. Also for Australia, Savage and Wright (2003) found that after correcting 
for endogeneity, the extent of moral hazard can increase the expected length of a 
hospital stay up to three times.
Liu, Nestic and Vukina (2012), using matching estimators, found the presence of a 
significant moral hazard effect in the Croatian health care system. In the case of 
Spain, Vera-Hernandez (1999) found no evidence of moral hazard for heads-of-
households and strong evidence for other household members. Holly et al. (1998), 
using data for Switzerland, found evidence of moral hazard in hospital stays. Coul-
son et al. (1995) found that supplemental insurance increases the number of pre-
scriptions filled by the elderly in the United States. Manning et al. (1987) used a 
randomized experiment and found that a catastrophic insurance plan reduces ex-
penditures 31% relative to zero out-of-pocket price, indicating a large moral hazard 
effect. Cardon and Hendel (2001) integrated health insurance and health care de-
mand using 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey data and found that the gap 
in expenditure between insured and uninsured can be attributed to observable de-
mographic differences and to price sensitivity. They interpreted the elasticity of 
demand with respect to price (coinsurance rate) as evidence of moral hazard.
In this paper, we rely on the fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design to esti-
mate the effect of losing insurance on health care consumption in young adults. 
We use invoice data for outpatient hospital services from a regional hospital in 
Croatia. Croatia has a state-run health insurance system dominated by a single 
public health insurance fund, the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance (HZZO). 
The HZZO offers compulsory and supplemental insurance. The former covers 
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340 of medical care services is provided to children younger than 18 and to all patients 
suffering from specific serious illnesses. All other health services are subject to 
co-payments. In order to avoid these co-payments, supplemental insurance is re-
quired. The compulsory insurance coverage is universal whereas supplemental 
insurance can be either bought or is extended automatically free of charge to some 
categories of citizens such as, for example, full time students.
In this context, the 18th birthday represents a threshold for supplemental insurance 
coverage; young adults crossing the threshold will lose full coverage and face 
three options: stay in school and continue being fully covered for free, buy sup-
plemental insurance and continue enjoying full coverage or refuse to buy the sup-
plemental coverage and pay co-payments as required.
Since crossing the 18th birthday threshold is not a unique determinant of assign-
ment into the treatment (losing the coverage), the problem fits into the fuzzy RD 
design. RD design can be used to determine the treatment effects in quasi-experi-
mental settings where treatment is determined by a forcing variable exceeding the 
threshold. The probability of being treated at the threshold jumps from zero to one 
(see: Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In the fuzzy RD design, the forcing variable does 
not exclusively determine the treatment assignment, hence the discontinuity in the 
probability of being treated at the threshold is less than one.
Regression discontinuity design has been used extensively to determine the causal 
effect from an intervention. For example, Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2009) 
 compared health care consumption among people just before and just after the age 
of 65, the threshold for Medicare eligibility in the U.S., in a sharp RD design. 
They found that the Medicare eligibility causes a discontinuous increase in health 
care utilization. Van der Klaauw (2002) identified the causal effect of financial aid 
on college enrollment decisions using fuzzy RD. He found that enrollment rate 
increased by about 0.2 at the financial aid eligibility threshold. Chen and van der 
Klaauw (2008) evaluated the effect of disability insurance program on labor force 
participation among disability insurance beneficiaries using fuzzy RD design. 
They found that the labor force participation rate among those beneficiaries would 
have been 20% higher if none had received the benefits. Anderson, Dobkin, Gross 
(2012) used the age 19 as an instrument to identify the causal effect of loss of 
health insurance at age 19 on health care consumption. They found that not having 
insurance leads to a decreasing level of health care consumption, manifested in a 
40 percent reduction in emergency department visits and a 61 percent reduction in 
inpatient hospital admissions.
A distinct feature of our data set which considerably complicates the estimation is 
that it consists of users only. People that did not use the medical services of the 
hospital during the time period covered by the data do not show up in the data. The 
problem of estimating the moral hazard effect with users-only data is caused by 
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341often precisely because they do not have the insurance. Using users-only (pa-
tients) data clearly underestimates the moral hazard effect. To deal with this at-
tenuation bias we use the instrumental variables (IV) approach from Anderson, 
Dobkin and Gross (2012), which relies on the assumption that the net change in 
the observed hospital visits after the age threshold of 18 is driven only by indi-
viduals who have lost their insurance coverage, an assumption implied by the 
standard IV exclusion restriction. We found a statistically significant reduction in 
the number of hospital visits by 92% for young adults who had lost their supple-
mental insurance after turning 18, confirming the moral hazard hypothesis.
2 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA DESCRIPTION
The healthcare system in Croatia is still largely dominated by the institutional 
setup inherited from socialism. Despite the fact that the generous benefits and 
exemptions inherited from the old system have been politically difficult to roll 
back, Croatia has embarked on a number of reform initiatives that resulted in a 
relative decline in total spending on health care. Reforms have included enlarging 
the participation scheme (co-payments), reducing the number of individuals ex-
empt from participation, introduction of administrative fees, and some cost sav-
ings in prescription drugs expenditures (Liu, Nestic and Vukina, 2012). Croatia 
still spends 7.9% of its GDP on health, among the highest for new EU members. 
In a fiscally constrained environment, the Croatian health system faces a mis-
match between declining available public resources, growing expenditures and 
the increasing needs of an ageing population (Word Bank, 2015).
The main characteristics of the system provided by the HZZO can be summarized 
as follows. The compulsory insurance, which is funded by a 15% payroll tax, cov-
ers two kinds of medical care services: one with full coverage and the other with 
a system of co-payments. Full coverage medical care services are provided to 
children up to 18 years of age, pregnant women and for everybody else for life-
threatening types of conditions such as infectious diseases, psychiatric care, sur-
geries, cancers and mandatory vaccinations, all other health services (including 
but not limited to primary care, hospitals stays and prescription drugs) are subject 
to a system of co-payments. The patients are required to pay 20% of the full price 
of medical care, with the largest out-of-pocket cost share amount set at 3,000.00 
HRK per invoice.1 Supplemental insurance is voluntary and can be acquired by a 
person 18 years or older who has compulsory insurance, by signing a contract 
with the HZZO. Certain categories of citizens are entitled to the supplemental in-
surance free of charge, i.e. their premiums are covered from the state budget. The 
list of people entitled to free supplemental insurance includes full time secondary 
school and college students. For those not entitled to free supplemental coverage, 
the premiums range from 50 to 130 HRK per month depending on income and 
whether the insured is active or retired. A person having the supplemental insur-
1 The figures are reflective of the year 2009 which is the year covered by the dataset. The exchange rate for the 
local currency, Croatian kuna (HRK), as of June 20, 2009 was 1USD=5.19 HRK. A more detailed description 
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342 ance is entitled to full waiver of all the medical expense co-payments mentioned 
before.
The original data set consists of all invoices for all outpatient services from a 
small hospital in Croatia during the period from March 1 to June 30, 2009.2 The 
data set consists of 105,646 observations. Each observation reflects one hospital 
visit (invoice). The data contains the following set of variables: a numeric code for 
the type of hospital service provided, compulsory health insurance number, sup-
plemental insurance number (if the patient has one), period covered by the sup-
plemental insurance, numeric code for categories entitled to supplemental insur-
ance free of charge, eligibility category for compulsory insurance, cost of hospital 
service, part of the cost covered by compulsory insurance, part of cost covered by 
supplemental insurance, part of cost covered by participation (co-payment), date 
of birth and sex of the patient. The invoices do not record the exact date when the 
patient visited the hospital, but are chronologically ordered. To determine the date 
of the visit, we first divided all invoices into 122 days (March 1 to June 30) and 
designated the first 866 invoices as March 1st invoices, the next 866 invoices as 
March 2nd invoices, etc. This is a fairly innocuous simplification because the ac-
tual number of daily appointments is determined by the hospital’s outpatient ca-
pacity and it is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the average number of pa-
tients treated each day is approximately the same. Since we know the date of birth 
of each patient and knowing the day of the visit, we can calculate the number of 
days each patient was away from the 18th birthday when they visited the hospital. 
For patients younger than 18, the days away from the 18th birthday are recorded as 
negative numbers and for patients older than 18 as positive numbers.
3 REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN
In the basic setting for the regression discontinuity design researchers are inter-
ested in the causal effect of a binary intervention or treatment. Individuals are ei-
ther exposed or not exposed to a treatment. Let WiÎ{0, 1} denote a treatment with 
Wi = 1 if unit i was exposed to the treatment and Wi = 0 otherwise. Let Yi(Wi) de-
note the outcome where Yi (0) is the outcome without the exposure to treatment 
and Yi (1) is the outcome with exposure to treatment. We are interested in the dif-
ference Yi (1) - Yi (0). Since one can never observe Yi (0) and Yi (1) at the same time, 
one needs to use the average effects of the treatment over the population or a 
sample to estimate the average treatment effect.
It is important to distinguish two RD settings: sharp and fuzzy regression discon-
tinuity designs. Based on Imbens and Lemieux (2008), in the sharp regression 
discontinuity (SRD) design, the assignment Wi is a deterministic function of one 
2 The hospital in question is one of the general medicine regional hospitals in Croatia which provides all  typical 
services such as internal medicine, surgery, anesthesiology, pediatrics, psychiatry, neurology, obstetrics and 
gynecology, radiology, pathology and emergency care at a fairly standard (basic) level. All complicated cases 
are typically referred to one of the larger medical centers in the capital Zagreb. The name and the location of 
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343of the covariates, i.e. the forcing (or treatment-determining) variable X such that 
Wi  = 1 if Xi ³ c and Wi = 0 if Xi < c, where c is some constant. Therefore, all units 
with the value of the forcing variable Xi  = x at least c are assigned to the treatment 
group and participation is mandatory whereas all units with the value of forcing 
variable Xi  = x less than c are assigned to the control group. In the SRD design, 
the interest is to use the discontinuity in the conditional expectation of the out-
come given the forcing variable in order to estimate the average treatment effect:
  , (1)
which is interpreted as the average causal effect of the treatment:
  (2)
at the discontinuity point.
In the fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) design, however, the probability of 
being treated does not need to jump from zero to one at the threshold. The design 
allows other factors to influence the assignment to treatment, besides the forcing 
variable. Therefore, only a jump in the probability of assignment to the treatment 
at the threshold is required:
 . (3)
The average causal effect of the treatment:
  (4)
is identified as the ratio of the jump in the outcome at the threshold over the jump 
in the treatment indicator at the threshold. In our particular case expression (4) 
measures the average causal effect on health care utilization (as measured by the 
number of hospital visits) of losing insurance as the result of turning 18.
3.1 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE APPROACH
An important reason to choose FRD instead of some other causal inference meth-
ods is that it naturally solves the endogeneity problem by using the discontinuity 
as an instrument (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). To estimate the ratio in equation (4) 
we follow the approach of Anderson, Dobkin and Gross (2012). To explain the 
procedure, consider the following reduced form model of the effect of health in-
surance coverage on health care utilization:
  , (5)
where Yi indicates health care utilization of individual i, Di is an indicator variable 
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344 ficients to be estimated. All other determinants of health care utilization are sum-
marized in the error term εi. Therefore, the coefficient γ1 denotes the causal effect of 
health insurance on health care utilization, also known as the moral hazard effect.
However, this moral hazard effect is contaminated by other factors because the 
insurance coverage variable Di is correlated with other determinants of health care 
utilization in εi, for example, the unobserved health status of that individual. An 
individual chooses to acquire health insurance based on idiosyncracies that simul-
taneously affect the decision to be insured and the consumption of health care. 
Therefore the estimate for γ1 is inconsistent due to endogeneity. To solve the prob-
lem one typically relies on the IV approach. The objective is to estimate the causal 
effect of losing health insurance coverage on the number of hospital visits. Using 
crossing the 18th birthday threshold as an instrument, we estimate the first stage 
equation – the share of young adults who lose the insurance coverage while 
 crossing the age 18 threshold and the reduced form equation – the change in the 
number of hospital visits associated with attaining the age of eighteen. We  identify 
the effect of the moral hazard (coefficient γ1) by dividing the reduced form  estimate 
(the effect of turning 18 on the number of visits) by the first stage estimate (the 
effect of turning 18 on health insurance coverage).3
Notice however, that having hospital invoices data introduces sample selection bias 
in the first stage estimation because we only observe the insurance status for indi-
viduals who do show up in the hospital and do consume some services for which 
they or their insurer is charged. Regression estimate of the change in the proportion 
of uninsured after crossing the age 18 threshold understates the true size of this 
change. Because loss of insurance reduces the likelihood of a hospital visit and 
therefore affects the probability of appearing in the sample, this selection mecha-
nism leads to an attenuation bias when estimating the change in the insurance cov-
erage because newly uninsured individuals are more likely to leave the sample.
To correct for the bias in the first-stage estimates we assume that the net change in 
the observed hospital visits after crossing the age 18 threshold is driven only by 
individuals who have lost insurance coverage. This assumption is implied by the 
standard IV exclusion restriction and is quite reasonable. Because all our patients 
in the Y-18 group are fully insured, those who did not go to the hospital before 18 
(when they had insurance) and hence did not show up in the data as users, are 
unlikely to visit hospital immediately after turning 18 even if they have insurance 
and even less likely if they don’t have insurance.
Let Di denote the insurance coverage indicator and Ai = a denote the age of an 
individual. Then the effect of crossing the age 18 threshold on insurance coverage 
at the population level can be expressed as:
3 This strategy is analogous to using the age 18 discontinuity as an instrument to identity the causal effect of 
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345  , (6)
Next, let Di (1) = 1 indicate an individual older than 18 with insurance coverage 
and Di (1) = 0 an individual older than 18 without insurance. Di (0) = 1 and Di (0) 
= 0 are defined similarly for individuals younger than 18. Also, let Yi (1) = 1 denote 
an individual older than 18 who did visit the hospital and Yi (1) = 0 an individual 
older than 18 who did not visit the hospital. Yi (0) = 1 and Yi (0) = 0 are defined 
similarly for individuals younger than 18. Since we could only observe individu-
als who visited the hospital (users), the effect of turning 18 on insurance coverage 
among users is estimated as:
 . (7)
However, we would like to estimate the effect of turning 18 on insurance coverage 
at the population level, given that they visited the hospital when they were younger 
than 18:
 . (8)
The desired effect is estimated as follows. First we denote the number of visits 
made before 18 as yo, the number of insured visits made before 18 as do, the num-
ber of visits made after 18 as y1 and the number of insured visits made after 18 as 
d1. The ratios  and  represent the fractions of insured visits before and after 
the age of 18. The corresponding fractions of uninsured visits before and after the 
age of 18 are denoted as  and . It can be shown that the bias-cor-
rected estimate for the effect of crossing 18 on the insurance coverage is obtained as:
  , (9)
where  denotes the convergence in probability. Expression (9) then provides the 
population level estimate defined by equation (8).4
Under a simplifying assumption that number of visits per patient is constant5, 
equation (9) can be estimated as:
. (10)
Since we are interested in estimating how an increase in the proportion of the 
uninsured affects the change in hospital visits as people turn 18, we need to esti-
mate the following equation:
4 For proof see web support to Anderson, Dobkin and Gross (2012).
5 As explained later in the estimation procedure section, this approach does not exploit the panel structure of 
the data set, i.e. we are only using the number of visits (insured and uninsured) in each week regardless of the 
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 (11)
where Ui is an indicator equal to one if individual i is uninsured, i.e. Ui =1 – Di.
In the second step, we estimate the reduced form equation, i.e. the percentage 
decline in visits due to crossing the age 18 threshold, which can be written as:
  , (12)
and obtained by the following estimator:
  . (13)
It can be shown that (12) converges in probability to:
  (14)
where the first factor on the right hand side denotes the measure of moral hazard 
for individuals who visited the hospital before turning 18 and lost the insurance 
coverage after turning 18 and the second factor denotes the first stage estimate 
from equation (9), i.e. the change in insurance coverage due to reaching one’s 18th 
birthday.6 Therefore, the measure of moral hazard is computed as the ratio of the 
reduced form estimate and the first stage estimate.
3.2 ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
The key decision in implementing RD design relates to the choice of bandwidth. In 
most current empirical studies researchers often choose a bandwidth by either cross-
validation or by ad hoc methods. We rely instead on the optimal, data-dependent, 
bandwidth choice rule introduced by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Estimation 
of the optimal bandwidth was performed with the invoice level data using uniform 
kernel on [-1,+1] interval. Both a one-year and a two-year data window surrounding 
the 18th birthday yield very similar estimates of the optimal bandwidth of 1.24 and 
1.23 years, respectively (64 weeks surrounding the threshold).7
Once optimal bandwidth has been determined, all invoices for the patients outside 
the 64 weeks surrounding the 18th birthday threshold were dropped, leaving the 
6 The proof of this result is also contained in the web support to Anderson, Dobkin and Gross (2012).
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347sample of 1,883 invoices in total. The summary statistics for this 64 weeks win-
dow are presented in table 1. In the left panel we look at the number of visits 
(invoices). If the invoice shows that the patient visited the hospital with both com-
pulsory and supplemental insurance, we call it an insured visit, otherwise it is an 
uninsured visit. In other words, an uninsured visit in this paper means a visit to the 
hospital when the patient did not have the supplemental insurance. Therefore, the 
younger than 18 group (Y-18) has only insured visits whereas the older than 18 
group (O-18) has both insured and uninsured visits. The number of uninsured 
visits is only 3% of the total visits.
Table 1
Summary statistics: 64-week window around the age 18
Visits Patients
Sample Invoices Insured Uninsured Male Female Number Male Female Visits/patient
Y-18 1,063 1,063  0 480   583 393 181 212 2.71 (3.16)
O-18    820    763 57 372   448 360 152 208 1.98 (1.85)
Total 1,883 1,826 57 852 1,031 753 333 420 2.36 (2.64)
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
We also compared the number of visits by gender. In both Y-18 and O-18 groups, 
women visited the hospital more frequently than men. In the right panel we look 
at the summary statistics at the patient level. We see that, overall, the sample con-
tains more women than men, which probably explains why we observe more fe-
male than male visits. Also, the average number of visits per patient has dropped 
when the age 18 threshold is crossed from 2.71 to 1.98 visits per patient. The O-18 
group has fewer people visiting the hospital and a lower number of visits per pa-
tient but the number of female patients dropped less than the number of male pa-
tients as they passed their 18th birthday.
We start the estimation by collapsing the individual invoices data into weekly data 
and count the number of total and uninsured visits in each week around the pa-
tients’ 18th birthday. The numbers of days away from the 18th birthday are con-
verted into the numbers of weeks away from the 18th birthday.
The scatter plot and fitted values of the percentages of uninsured visits in each of 
the 64 weeks away from age 18 are depicted in figure 1. The fitted lines are esti-
mated separately on each side of the cutoff point. There is a clear jump in the 
percentage of uninsured visits at the cutoff point at age 18. The proportion of un-
insured visits is zero for people younger than 18 because all are fully covered by 
both compulsory and supplemental insurance.
The scatter plot and fitted values of the log of the total visits in each of the 64 
weeks surrounding the 18th birthday are displayed in figure 2. There is a sharp 
drop in hospital visits at the cutoff point at age 18. The graphs provide powerful 
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The primary concern in the RD design is that factors other than insurance cover-
age such as high school graduation, starting college, obtaining driving license, 
entering legal drinking age and starting employment could change discontinu-
ously at the age of 18 and dramatically alter the need to access health care. Be-
cause we measure age at the weekly level, only factors that change sharply within 
a few weeks around the age 18 threshold could bias our estimates. As it turns out, 
most of those obvious confounders should not bias our estimates. First, high 
school graduations occur in June and universities start classes in September or 
October but 18th birthdays are distributed throughout the year. Second, Croatia has 
a law on the books prohibiting people younger than 18 to purchase or consume 
alcohol. Yet, there is ample anecdotal evidence that the enforcement is fairly lax, 
especially in establishments outside the larger cities and along the Adriatic coast 
Figure 1
Uninsured visits surrounding patients’ 18th birthday (64-week window)
Figure 2
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349during the tourist season. Finally, a potentially interesting factor is the legal driv-
ing age. At age 18 young adults in Croatia become eligible to drive. However, 
since the drivers’ education process is quite lengthy and expensive, most young 
adults will not obtain their licenses exactly on their 18th birthday but rather during 
that year or even later.
Based on the framework developed before, in the first step we estimate the limit 
expectations in equation (11) by seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) using the 
following two equations:
  (15)
where j=1, 2, ..., 128; dj and yj are weekly counts of insured visits and total visits 
respectively, aweekj is age in weeks equals  if the visits are made in the first 
week after turning 18, equals  if the visits are made in the second week after 
turning 18, etc., aweekj equals 0 if the visits are made on the 18
th birthday, aweekj 
equals   if the visits are made in the first week before turning 18, etc., Iover18j is 
an indicator variable equal to one if observation j is older than 18 and εj, µj are 
random errors with E(εj ) = 0, E(µj ) = 0 and Cov(εj, µj ) ≠ 0. The dependent vari-
ables are the weekly percent of uninsured visits  and the natural log of weekly 
number of visits ln yj. Since the errors affecting percentage of uninsured visits and 
total visits in each week are likely to be correlated, the use of SUR is justified.
Using estimated coefficients from equation (15), the limit expectations in equation 
(11) can be recovered as follows:
where , ,  and  drop out because aweek = 0 at the limit of age 18. There-
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350 In the second step we estimate the limit expectations in equation (13) using the 
following equation:
  (17)
which turns out to be identical to the second equation from (15). Therefore, the 
reduced form estimator for the percentage change in hospital visits for individuals 
turning 18 is:
  (18)
where ,  drop out in the limit.
Based on equation (14), it is straightforward to see that the moral hazard effect y1 
is identified by dividing the effect of turning 18 on hospital visits, i.e. the reduced 
form estimator from equation (18), by the effect of turning 18 on insurance cover-




The first-step SUR results of equation (15) are presented in table 2. The top panel 
indicates that the percentage of uninsured visits increases after people turn 18 
by about 5%. This represents the short-run effect of loss of insurance. Splitting 
the sample by gender reveals exactly the same pattern of behavior for young men 
and women.
Table 2
Seemingly unrelated regression results: 64-week window 
Variable Total Male Female
Dependent Independent
Iover18j 0.051 (0.023)** 0.051 (0.023)** 0.051 (0.023)**
aweekj 0.000 (0.023) 0.000 (0.023) 0.000 (0.023)
aweekj * Iover18j 0.018 (0.033) 0.018 (0.033) 0.018 (0.033)
Constant 0.000 (0.016) 0.000 (0.016) 0.000 (0.016)
ln yj
Iover18j -0.485 (0.149)*** -0.488 (0.149)*** -0.485 (0.149)***
aweekj 0.504 (0.146)*** 0.491 (0.145)*** 0.504 (0.146)***
aweekj * Iover18j -0.548 (0.209)*** -0.536 (0.208)** -0.548 (0.209)***
Constant 2.994 (0.104)*** 2.997 (0.103)*** 2.994 (0.104)***
Note: The dependent variables in the regressions are proportion of uninsured visits and log 
of visits at each age in weeks. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** – 1% significance level; 
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351We expect the coefficient reflecting the long-term effect of loss of insurance, 
aweekj * Iover18j, to be negative. This would indicate that with the passage of time, 
the percentage of uninsured people should decrease, as those who lost the sup-
plemental insurance after the 18th birthday would gradually become more inclined 
to purchase the coverage. However, our estimate of this coefficient is positive, 
though not significantly different from zero, indicating that, at least during the first 
year after reaching the age of 18, the percentage of young adults with supple-
mental insurance will not change significantly. This seems to indicate that all 
those that have supplemental insurance beyond the 18th birthday have it by de-
fault, i.e. by maintaining their full-time student status rather than by actually pur-
chasing the policy.
The bottom panel of table 2 results indicate that the number of hospital visits de-
creases by about 32% (exp(0.485)-1) as young adults cross the 18th birthday 
threshold. Again, there is hardly any difference in the behavior between genders. 
In this equation, the coefficient on aweekj * Iover18j is negative and statistically sig-
nificant indicating that the long-term effect of loss of insurance is negative, at least 
within the first 64 weeks, given that the number of visits further decreases with 
time (age).
The second-step OLS regression results of the reduced form equation (17) are 
displayed in table 3. The coefficients are the same as those obtained using SUR 
(bottom panel of table 2) but the SUR results are more efficient.
Table 3
OLS regression results: 64-week window
Variable Total Male Female
Dependent Independent
ln yj
Iover18j -0.485 (0.152)*** -0.488 (0.151)*** -0.485 (0.152)***
aweekj 0.504 (0.148)*** 0.491 (0.147)*** 0.504 (0.148)***
aweekj * Iover18j -0.548 (0.212)** -0.536 (0.211)** -0.548 (0.212)**
Constant 2.994 (0.106)*** 2.997 (0.105)*** 2.994 (0.106)***
Note: The dependent variable in the regression is log of visits at each age in weeks. Standard 
errors are in parentheses.
The results presented in tables 2 and 3 were obtained with hospital users-only data 
and as such are not generally valid. We are interested in results that reflect the 
population as a whole. Table 4 summarizes these results. The asymptotically cor-
rect (bias corrected) estimates of the increment in the percentage of uninsured at 
age 18 (based on equation 16) are displayed in the left-hand column. We estimated 
a 42% increase in the percentage of uninsured in the whole population, with neg-
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The percentage change in hospital visits at the age 18 (based on equation 18) is 
displayed in the middle column of table 4. The three segments of the population 
all experience a close to 38.5% decrease in the number of hospital visits as they 
cross their 18th birthday threshold.
The right-hand-side column of table 4 shows the estimates of the moral hazard 
effect, i.e. the reduction in hospital visits for individuals who visited the hospital 
before the age of 18 but lost their health insurance after reaching the age of 18. 
There is a 92% decrease in visits in this group of people. This figure reflects both 
increased probability of becoming uninsured and the drop in the numbers of hos-
pital visits.
How can one interpret these results? Relying on the summary statistics from table 
1, we see that the number of uninsured visits in the O-18 group is 57, which indi-
cates a 92% reduction in the number of visits due to loss of insurance. Without the 
moral hazard effect, the number of visits would have been 57/(1-0.924)=750. In 
other words, 750-57=693 visits never happened because people who lost insur-
ance either never came to the hospital or came less frequently.
We can further compare the actual work load of the hospital staff with the hypo-
thetical workload that would have occurred if nobody lost the insurance after 
passing their 18th birthday. Assuming the hospital is opened 6 days a week, the 
actual workload of 17-19 year olds was 18.1 visits per day (1,883 visits/104 days), 
whereas the hypothetical workload would have been 24.8 visits per day 
((1,883+693)/104), a substantial 37% increase.
Another way to look at the result is to take the total number of visits in the Y-18 
group (1,063, table 1) and apply a 38.5% decrease in hospital visits based on the 
reduced form estimate (middle column, table 4). This would give 409 visits. Tak-
ing the number of insured visits in the Y-18 group (which is also 1,063 because all 
visits are insured) and applying a 41.6% increase in uninsured visits from the first 
stage estimates (table 4) yields 442 as the number of uninsured visits. Finally di-
viding 409/442=0.92 gives us the population-wide estimate of the reduction in the 
number of visits due to the loss of insurance. This figure coincides with the instru-
mental variables estimate of moral hazard (table 4, right-hand column).
Table 4
Percent change in uninsured (first stage) and total visits (reduced form) and the 
moral hazard (IV): 64-week window
Sample First stage Reduced form IV estimator
Total 0.416 (0.086)*** -0.385 (0.093)*** -0.924 (0.054)***
Male 0.418 (0.086)*** -0.386 (0.093)*** -0.924 (0.054)***
Female 0.416 (0.086)*** -0.385 (0.093)*** -0.924 (0.054)***
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353Since the data used in the estimation covers only a 4-month period, we need to 
multiply the number of visits that never happened by 3 to obtain an annual esti-
mate of moral hazard at the hospital level. This calculation gives an estimate of 
2,079 visits per year.
Finally, the reduction in the number of visits can be converted into a monetary 
measure of moral hazard by using the average cost per visit (HRK 157.76). This 
yields around HRK 328,000 (USD 63,200) worth of savings at the hospital level 
per year.8 Assuming that the convergence region for the regional hospital in ques-
tion coincides with the population of the county where the hospital is located, we 
can obtain a monetary estimate of the moral hazard per capita. Because our esti-
mates of moral hazard are based on a 1.24-year window (64 weeks), we approxi-
mate the relevant number of people who passed the age of 18 by the entire 18 
year-old cohort plus 24% of the 19 year-old cohort. Based on the 2011 Census, 
the population of 18-year-olds in the county was 1,401 and the population of 
19-year-olds was 1,497, so the moral hazard per person is calculated as 328,000/
(1401+0.24*1497) = HRK 186.
How economically significant is this effect at the national level? Based on the 
2011 Census figures, the population of 18-year-olds in Croatia was 47,960 and the 
population of 19-year-olds was 50,790. This gives an estimate of 60,150 young 
adults who crossed the 18th birthday threshold during the 1.24-year window and 
the total moral hazard cost of approximately HRK 11.2 million. Therefore, the 
total cost of extending the supplemental insurance for all young adults in the 
country from the current age 18 to age 19.4 would consist of two components: (a) 
the direct loss in collected premiums for supplemental insurance, and (b) the indi-
rect cost of moral hazard. Assuming the highest premium for supplemental insur-
ance of HRK 130 per month gives us a total cost of HRK 7.8 million per year in 
lost premiums plus the indirect cost of moral hazard of HRK 11.2 million per year, 
for the total of HRK 19 million.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we implemented fuzzy regression discontinuity design to estimate 
the moral hazard effect in the health care consumption of young adults drawing on 
invoice data from one small regional hospital in Croatia. The challenge in estimat-
ing moral hazard with such a dataset is that we only observe people who actually 
used medical care services within the time period covered by the data. To deal 
with this sample selection bias, we estimate the causal effect of insurance on med-
ical care consumption using the 18th birthday as an instrumental variable. The 18th 
birthday represents a threshold at which young adults will, by default, lose the full 
8 A more precise monetary estimate of the moral hazard effect would be possible by looking at the change in 
the cost structure of visits before and after crossing the age 18 threshold. The average cost per visit for the 
Y-18 group is HRK 132.90, for O-18 group HRK 189.99, and for both groups combined HRK 157.76. How-
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354 coverage unless they remain full time students or decide to buy the coverage on 
their own. The estimation uses weekly counts of hospital visits. Results based on 
the 64 weeks window estimation show that there is an 92% decrease in hospital 
visits due to loss of insurance among individuals who did visit the hospital before 
age 18 and lost their insurance after passing the age of 18.
As an illustration, the above numbers can be related to an alternative program re-
cently promulgated by the Croatian government. Given a severe youth unemploy-
ment problem9, starting January 1, 2015, the government has launched a program 
whereby the employers are excused from paying the payroll taxes of 17.2% 
(health insurance earmarked tax rate of 15% plus some other taxes of 2.2%) for a 
period of up to 5 years for every new employee below the age of 30. For an em-
ployee with an average net salary of HRK 5,800 per month the total savings for 
the employer amount to HRK 11,971 per year. Of course, the amount of money 
saved by an employer represents a loss to HZZO or the state budget. Relying on 
the data published by the Croatian Employment Service (Hrvatski zavod za 
zapošljavanje, HZZ), the total unemployment in the 15-29 age cohort amounts to 
102,483 persons. Assuming an optimistic scenario whereby the newly introduced 
measure will reduce youth unemployment by about 10% or 10,250 people per 
year, the total cost to the HZZO or the state budget can be estimated at HRK 122.7 
million per year.
A comparison of benefits of the two mentioned programs would require a more 
elaborate modeling and simulation, which is outside the scope of this paper. Nev-
ertheless, the above example highlights several interesting points. First, the cost of 
moving the threshold for free supplemental insurance from 18 to 19.4 years would 
cost less than one sixth of the employment stimulus package currently in place. 
Second, a significant part of that cost is the cost of moral hazard and not the budg-
etary costs due to lost insurance premiums, hence, the actual impact on hospitals’ 
workloads in terms of increased number of visits could be significant. However, 
the national health effect of such a program could be substantial. Recall that losing 
the supplemental insurance at the age of 18 caused a reduction in the number of 
hospital visits. Some of those lost visits could have profound impacts on early 
disease detection and prevention and could actually save a lot of money for the 
health insurance system in the future.
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